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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

Domestic Relations-Full Faith and Credit-Effect of Decree
Granting Custody of Children
A husband domiciled in Wisconsin obtained a divorce decree in
Wisconsin from his non-resident, absent wife, and an order awarding
him the custody of the children. He filed for habeas corpus in Ohio
to obtain the children after the wife violated the decree. The wife
contended that Ohio should deny full faith and credit because Wisconsin had no personal jurisdiction over her. The husband reasoned
that his domicile plus that of the children was a sufficient jurisdictional
basis to enable Wisconsin, also the marital domicile, to bind all parties
interested in their custody. At the time of the decree, although the
children were admittedly domiciled in Wisconsin, they were temporarily with their mother in Ohio on the understanding that they would
be returned to their father in Wisconsin if the mother remained in
Ohio. Held: the ex parte decree fixing custody of children was not entitled to full faith and credit, in the absence of personal jurisdiction
over the mother.'
Prior to this decision, state courts had disagreed as to whether full
faith and credit 2 should be extended to a custody decree where jurisdiction was based on domicile of the child alone; 3 the weight of authority 4 and the Restatement 5 supporting the dissenting view in the principal case. As a result of this and prior United States Supreme Court
cases,0 the following conclusion may be drawn: if a spouse secured
divorce, alimony, and custody decrees in a state where the plaintiff
and children are domiciled, the defendant being domiciled elsewhere
and the children absent from the forum, the only decree entitled to
May v. Anderson,-345 U.S. 528 (1953). See Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610
(1946).

-U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 1.
'Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce Suits, 7 Cornell L.Q. 1 (1921)
("To state the questions generally-(1) what constitutes jurisdiction, from the
standpoint of Conflict of Laws, to render a decree awarding custody of a minor
child; (2) what effect should such an award have in another state.").
"Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 136 (3d ed. 1949) ("Jurisdiction to award
custody of children in a divorce action is in the courts of the domicile of the
children."); § 422 ("The weight of authority holds that the decree is conclusive
as to all matters up to the time of its rendition, and will be recognized and
given effect in another state."); Note, 9 A.L.R.2d 454 (1950) (cases collected).
See Barnes v. Morash, 156 Neb. 721, 57 N.W.2d 783 (1953). This note is limited
to the discussion of a decree awarding custody where the child was domiciled
in the state of decree and the effect such a decree should have in another state.
Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 117 (1934) ("A state can exercise through
its courts jurisdiction to determine the custody of children or to create the
status of guardian of the person only if the domicile of the person placed under
custody or guardianship is within the state."); Id at § 147, comment a ("An
award of custody, like any other judgment or decree of a competent court,
is entitled to recognition and enforcement in other states.").
6
Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1947); Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 (1947).

', RECENT CASES
full faith and credit is the one terminating the marital status of
husband and wife.
To justify giving full faith and credit to divorce decrees, the courts7
and text authoritiess have stated that the action is in rem, the res being
the status of the parties. This is in reality a fiction, and the same fiction
could be extended to the status of the children. There seem to be two
strong principles in conflict which provide the real reasons for these
holdings, rather than the fact that they are in rem or in personam. On
the one hand, there is the principle that the defendant should get the
best opportunity which the law can provide to protect his or her rights.
Thus a method of service ought to be required which is likely to reach
the defendant. On the other hand, there is the principle that a plaintiff
should be able to get some kind of court action to settle his rights.
This becomes especially important where it is difficult, if not impossible, to get service on the other party. The latter policy at present
prevails only in the decree affecting the status of man and wife.
The decision in the instant case presents additional difficulties. Two
basic ideas are found in the Williams cases 9 where full faith and
credit to divorce decrees was the issue: (1) if the forum rendering the
foreign judgment has jurisdiction, that decree is valid and must be
given full faith and credit; (2) jurisdiction can not be litigated in the
second forum if litigated in the first forum. The Williams cases gave
the full faith and credit clause additional force, but the principal case
appears to point out a reluctance on the part of the Court to extend
the clause any further at this time.10
In addition, the case seems to engender unpredictability. If the
locations of the husband and wife had been reversed in this case,
would the decision have been different? May an errant husband who
has left the home overturn a custody decree when, due to his absence,
there was no personal jurisdiction over him? If the children had been
physically present in Wisconsin would the decision have been the
same? Has the court created a situation where the Wisconsin courts
cannot bind the mother, and the Ohio courts cannot bind the father,
thus making possession nine points of the law?
Furthermore, no court has disputed the fact that the interests of

SAxtell v. Axtell, 181 Ga. 24, 181 S.E. 295 (1935).
' Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 132 (3d ed. 1949) ("A decree of divorce is
not a personal judgment secured by one person against another, but an act
of law operating upon the marital relation between the husband and wife. It
is often spoken of as an action in rem; the res being the marriage status.").
. I Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
"'Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Williams v. North Carolina, 317
U.S.'287 (1942). Also see the dissent of Mr. Justice Minton in the principal case,
345 U.S. 528 (1953).
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the children are the paramount consideration," but in the present
status of the relationship between states it seems that the forum
rendering the custody decree could just as adequately protect those
interests. Full faith and credit is extended to divorce decrees decided
by states which seek only to grind out divorces, and yet there is a
refusal to recognize custody decrees awarded by other state courts in
which courts have placed more "confidence." 12 If there is some reason
for not extending full faith and credit to the first decree, such as a
change in circumstances, the person seeking to avoid the first decree
should be able to prove the new circumstances, but all matters prior
to the first decree should be finally adjudicated. Also, it would be
better for the child if his status could be determined once and for all,
instead of being the subject of a constant struggle as long as the conditions present at the time of the custody decree remain substantially
the same.'

3

The instant decision is contrary to the Restatement 14 and weight
of authority, 6 seems to be inconsistent with the two Williams cases,'
and other United States Supreme Court decisions,' 7 amounts to a step
back from the trend of recent cases extending the power of the full
faith and credit clause, lacks any degree of predictability, and goes
farther than necessary to protect the welfare of the child, since a
change in conditions even under the minority view would call for

" May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953). The concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter is concerned mainly with this argument.
- Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 136 (3d ed. 1949) ("To allow relitigation
of the question involves an unfortunate lack of confidence in the competence
of the judicial officers of a sister state, and an unduly narrow interpretation
of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution.").
"May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) (Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissent
states: "The wife's marital ties may be dissolved without personal jurisdiction
over her by a state where the husband has a genuine domicile because the
concern of that state with the welfare and marital status of its domiciliary is
felt to be sufficiently urgent.... The claim of children as well as the homekeeping parent to have their status determined with reasonable certainty
and to be free from an incessant tug of war between squabbling parents, is
equally urgent.").
' Supra note 5.
' Supra note 4.
1 Supra note 9
See, e.g., Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1943) (Held: the
Georgia decree discharging the father's obligation to support his child was
entitled to full faith and credit in South Carolina. The child was bound by
the Georgia decision, even though the court had no jurisdiction to render a
decree adjudicating rights of the child since she was not even served with
process. She was bound by the Georgia decision because the father's liability
should be governed by the law of his domicile. The South Carolina court was
not trying to get a personal judgment against the father but simply to enforce

his duty to support out of assets in South Carolina.).

